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BAR BRIEFS

law of performance of a valid contract. McClintock, Conflict of
Laws as to Contracts: Minnesota Decisions, (1926) 10 Minnesota
Law Review 498, 499. The decision in the instant case is unquestionably correct, since the contract was both made and performed in New York, True v. Northern Pacific Ry Co., (1914) 126
Minn. 72, 75-76, 147 N. W. 948; Patterson v. Wyman, (1919) 142
Minn. 70, 72, 170 N. W. 928, but quaere as to what rule the Supreme Court of Minnesota would follow if a valid contract were
made in Minnesota to be performed in another state.
CONSTITUTIONAL . LAW-STATE

TAXATION

OF

INTERSTATE

COMMERCE*-The city of Richmond by ordinance required all solicitors to pay an annual tax before being permitted to solicit business within the city.' Appellant, a representative of a Washington,
D. C. firm, was arrested for soliciting without having previously
procured the required license. 2 Appellant was convicted and her
conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia. 3 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court she
contended that the statute upon which her conviction was based
was unconstitutional, inasmuch as it was repugnant to the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. 4 Held, reversed. Taxes
that discriminate against interstate commerce are unconstitutional and the court in each case will look at the practical consequences of such taxes to see if such discrimination is present. 5
Nippert v. City of Richmond, (U.S. 1946) 66 S. Ct. 586.
Until 1938, while the Court was dominated by the belief that
interstate commerce should be free from all state taxation, taxes
similar in design to the impost sought to be imposed in the principal case were consistently invalidated. 6 Then in Western Live
;This case note first appeared in Volume 44 of the Michingan Law Review at
page 1135, and we are indented to that publication ior permission to reprint it.
1 Richmond City Code (1939) c. 10, § 23. The ordinance lays an annual license
tax in the following terms: "(Upon) . . .- Agents-Solicitors-Persons, Firms or Corporations engaged in business as solicitors . . . $50.00 and one-half of one percentum
of the gross earnings, receipts, fees or commissions for the preceding license year in
excess of $1,000.00 . . ." Quoted by the Court, principal case at 587.
2 The firm in question employs solicitors throughout the country selling ladies'
garments at $2.98 each. The solicitor obtains the order and receives a down payment usually sufficient to pay the solicitor's commission. The order is then sent to
the home office and is filled through the mails. The record does not show whether
appellant would have been compensated by her company had she paid the tax. Yet
whether the company does or does iot absorb the tax should not affect the result.
3 183 Va. 689, 33 S. E. (2d) 206 (1945).
4 Article 1, Sec. 8 ,cl. 3, "Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce
. . . among the several States . . ."
5 The statute also required that in applying for the permit, "evidence of the
good character of the individual, the members of the firm, or the chief officers of
the corporation, as the case may be" had to be produced. The Director of Public
Safety was to make a reasonable investigation and if he was satisfied that the applicant was of a good moral character and fit to engage in the proposed business he
was to issue the permit.
The appellant, before the United States Supreme Court, argued that this discretionary power given to the director was sufficient to invalidate the measure without respect to the character of the tax. This contention had not been relied upon
in the lower court and the court did not consider this question. It does seem, however, that if the power given to the director can be shown to be a reasonable safety
measure it would not be open to attack.
6 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 7 S. Ct. 592 (1887),
was the first case involving such a tax to come before the Court. There the Court
flatly said at p. 497, "Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the
same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce . . ." Since then, and
until 1938, nineteen such taxes have been invalidated, culminating with Real Silk
Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325, 45 S. Ct. 529 (1925).
For specific references
to these cases and an analysis of them in respect to their possible effect upon a
sales tax of the type considered in the Berwind-White case, see Lockhart. "The Sales
Tax in Interstate Commerce," 52 Harv. L. Rev. 617 (1939). For bibliographical material
on this subject generally see 43 Mich. L. Rev. 761 at 774-775, items 47-51 (1945).
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Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 7 the Court rejected its formalistic
approach to this phase of the commerce question and conceded
that interstate commerce could be made to "pay its way" with the
added corollary that such commerce should not be exposed to bur8
dens not borne by local business. This departure was dictated
largely 'by the compelling economic needs of the states and the
belated realization that the commerce clause does not compel
complete "immunization" of interstate commerce to state regula-9
tion. This "new" approach led to the upholding of a New York
sales tax 'that applied to interstate as well as local sales since the
court could see no possibility of discrimination against interstate
commerce. 10 Also an annual fee imposed upon each vehicle used
in "peddling" goods brought into the state by an out-of-state
vendor has been upheld on the ground that the tax was imposed
upon the intrastate activity of "peddling" and not on interstate
In the light of this background the court had to
commerce."
examine the contention of the City of Richmond that the tax it
since it came within the "rationnow sought to impose was valid
ale" of this "new" approach. 12 Tho logic of the appellee takes
this form; "That the tax was imposed upon events which occurred
within the taxing jurisdiction and which are separate and distinct
from the transportation or intercourse which is interstate commerce." And appellee concludes that since -the local delivery
7 303 U. S. 250, 58 S. Ct. 546 (1938). Here New Mexico levied a 2 per cent tax
on the gross receipts from the sale of advertising by those engaged in the business
of publishing newspapers or magazines. The tax was levied upon a firm whose only
office was in New Mexico and whose journal had circulation in other states. The
Court's reasoning is noteworthy for the tax could have been supported on the basis
of orthodox doctrine.
8 In the Western Livestock case, 303 U. S. 250, 58 S. Ct. 546 (1938), the Court
stressed the fact that this was a tax that could not be repeated in other states. (If
freedom from cumulative burdens meant only protection against the imposition of
the same tax by other taxing authorities it would afford but slight protection. But
it seems clear from later cases that the Court is thinking of this freedom in a more
inclusive sense.) But where other states would be able to tax the same receipts the
tax was condemned. See Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913
(1938).
Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 59 S. Ct. 325 (1939).
Generally, see Traynor, "State Taxation and the Commerce Clause in the
Supreme Court, 1938 Term," 28 Cal. L. Rev. 168 (1940); Morrison, "State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce," 38 Ill. L. Rev. 727 (1942).
However, in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 64 S. Ct. 950
(1944) the Court did not seem to be worried about the possibility of cumulative burdens. As to whether the Court may distinguish transportation from commercial
enterprise in their approach to this problem, see Lockhart, "Gross Receipts on
Interstate Transportation and Communcation," 57 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1943).
9 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 309 U. S. 33, 60 S. Ct. 388 (1940).
This decision has been commonly interpreted to mean that no other state would be
able to tax the proceeds taxed by New York. If this were not so then the interstate
vendor would be exposed to multiple burdens. It seems therefore that the state of
market will be the one permitted to impose this tax. In view of this approach the
decision in the Western Livestock case cited in nots 7 and 8, infra, will have to be
reconsidered. The cases can be distinguished in terms of the object taxed, but,
whereas formerly the court looked to the object of the tax without considering the
effect of the measure of the tax, it seems that its present approach demands that it
consider both these factors. For a thorough discussion of gross receipt taxes generally, see Powell, "New Light on Gross Receipt Taxes," 53 Harv. L. Rev. 909 (1940).
10 But see Best v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454, 61 S. Ct. 334 (1940); McCarroll v.
Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176, 60 S. Ct. 504 (1940).
11 Caskey Baking Co., Inc. v. Virginia, 313 U. S. 117, 61 S. Ct. 881 (1941).
This
distinction between "peddling" and solicitation was recognized as early as the Robbins case cited in note 6, supra.
For general material on this subject: Wright,
Hawkers and Walkers in Early America (1927).
12 Some reliance was also placed upon more recent cases such as International
Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of Indiana, 322 U. S. 340, 64 S. Ct. 1019 (1944):
General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of Iowa, 322 U. S. 335, 64 S. Ct. 1028
(1944).
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could be made the jurisdictional base for the sales tax in the Berwind-White case, 13 the local activity of solicitation could serve the
same purpose here. Since Richmond placed its chief reliance on
the Berwind-White case, Justice Rutledge, writing the opinion of
the Court rejecting this contention, confines his discussion largely to those factors which differentiate the present tax and the
sales tax in that case. His analysis develops the following differences: (1) The business taxed in the Berwind-White case was
continuous whereas in the principal case there was no showing
that the appellant carried on a regular course of business. 14 (2)
The tax levied by New York was proportional to the volume of
business carried on while the present tax, since it required the
payment of a fixed sum for the privilege of soliciting business,
bore no such proportional relationship. (3) The flat tax, since it
reached commerce at its incipient stage, would tend to divert it
from such channels and this exclusionary effect would be magnified if the tax were raised or if it were adopted by other muncipalities within the state. (4) The recognition that the present tax,
though professing to apply alike to all solicitors, was in reality
directed at out-of-state competition inasmuch as the retail merchants within the state would not ordinarily resort to this type of
distribution. 15 This analysis serves effectually to distinguish the
cases and is sufficient justification for condemning the Richmond
tax. Far from restricting the taxing power of local sovereignties
the opinion emphasizes that interstate commerce should bear a
"fair share of the cost of local government."' 16 It demands only
that local governments, in framing taxing legislation, be selective
13 Although the Court in the Berwind-White case does say, "Here the tax is
conditioned upon a local activity, delivery of goods within the state upon their purchase for consumption," 309 U. S. 33 at 58, 60 S. Ct. 3811, it went on to say, "The
effect of the tax, even though measured by the sales price, as has been shown.
neither discriminates nor obstructs interstate commerce more than numerous other
state taxes which have repeatedly been sustained as involving no prohibited regulation of interstate commerce."
14 It is rather unfortunate that the Court still gives credence to McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U. S. 327, 64 S. Ct. 1023 (1944).
In denying the power of the state of
Arkansas to levy a sales tax upon goods shipped oy a Tennessee vendor into
Arkansas, the Court distinguished the ierwind-White case by pointing Out that the
Tennessee corporation, unlike the Pennsylvania corporation, did not maintain an
office in the vendee's state and that the sale in this case was completed in the
vendor's state. Since mere solicitation, if regular and continuous, can be considered
"doing business," (International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, (U. S .1946) 66 S.
Ct. 154) the distinction in terms of the nature of business done seems no longer to
be sound: and since Justice Rutledge concedes that ". . . the situation is difficult to
think of in which some incident of interstate transaction taking place within a state
could not be segregated by an act of mental. gymnastics and made the fulcrum of the
tax ....
," (id. at 589) the distinction in terms of final delivery seems also to be
without basis.
15 Principal case at 595. "...
Provincial interests and local power are at their
maximum weight in bringing about acceptance of this type of legislation." This is
giving expression to Justice Stone's "political representation" doctrine that, while
state legislation should be given fullest consideration, the Court should at the same
time consider whether such legislation is imposed upon those whose views can be
voiced through their representatives. For an expression of this approach, see South
Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U. S. 177 at 184, note 2, 53
S. Ct. 510 (1938) (state police regulation of commerce); McGoldrick v.
BerwindWhite, 309 U. S. 33 at 36, note 2,60 S. Ct. 388 (1940) (state taxation of interstate commerce); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 at 95, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940)
(civil liberties); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 58 S. Ct. 778 (1938)
(federal police legislation).
16 Principal case at 594. "There is no lack of power in the state or municipalities
to see that interstate commerce bears with local trade its fair share of the cost of
local government . . ." Then, after stating the Court's position as to discriminatory
taxes, Justice Rutledge continues, "other types of taxes are available for reaching
both portions which do not involve the forbidden evils or the necessity for putting
them upon some commerce in order to reach other."

BAR BRIEFS
in order to avoid discriminatory results. Undoubtedly this tax, if
applied so as to reach only those solicitors regularly engaged in
carrying on business within the city, would be valid. So applied it
would be free from attack as tending to exclude commerce, and
the possibility of similar impositions by other muncipalities would
not be relevant ;17 the only other danger that would have to be
guarded against would be that of having the measure construed as
an attempt to suppress interstate business under the guise of taxation. Income from sales completed by solicitors who would not
come within the concept of doing business might be reached by
some kind of grass receipts or net income tax. The varying factors
involved in each of the commerce clause cases highlight the difficulty that would face Congress if the Court should accept the
view of some of its members, that only a measure discriminatory
on its face be invalidated and that Congress be given the task of
shaping national policy with respect to other local legislation
affecting interstate commerce. 18 In the light of these considerations the position taken by the Court that it will continue to decide
"single local controversies" probably offers the best solution to
this problem. Aside from its assertion that it will continue to invalidate local taxes that are discriminatory and that it will look
beyond the face of the statute to evaluate the practical consequences of the legislation involved, the striking part of its decision is the fact that the burden of justifying its levy is made to
fall upon the state.19
George Brody, S. Ed.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-ADMISSIBILITY
OF EVIDENCE
SEIZED UPON ARREST FOR UNRELATED CRIME*-Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation armed with valid warrants
for the arrest of the appellant on charges -of violation of
the Mail Fraud Statute, U. S. C., tit. 18, sec. 338, 18 U. S. C. A.
sec. 338, 7 F. C. A., tit. 18, sec. 338, and of the National Stolen
Property Act, U.S.C., tit. 18, sec. 413-419, 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 413419, 7 F. C. A., tit. 18, sec. 413-419, entered the appellant's apartment, made the arrest, and incident thereto made a thorough
search of the premises with the declared purpose of "looking for
two stolen, cancelled checks," and for "any means that might
17 Principal case at 593, note 22. ". . . the difference between municipal and
statewide taxes may not be controlling or even relevant in relation to a tax which
' . . presents neithek the prohibitive consequences inherent in the Richmond's tax
nor any element of discrimination in favor of local business."
18 See dissenting opinions of Justice Black in Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304
U. S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913 (1938); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S.
434, 59 S. Ct. 325 (1939); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176, 60 S. C'.
504 (1940).
In the last case he said, "We would, therefore, leave the questions raised
by the Arkansas tax for consideration of Congress in a nation-wide survey of the
constantly increasing barriers to trade among the States." (Id. at 189.)
Justices
Frankfurter and Douglas concurred.
19 Justice Black dissented without writing an opinion. Justice Douglas wrote a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Murphy concurred.
Realizing that they were
unable to convert the Court to their view that a tax not discriminatory on its face
should be upheld, they contended. "that one who complains that a state tax, though
not discriminatory on its face, discriminates against interstate
commerce in
its
actual operation, should be required to come forward with proof to sustain the
charge." And this has been the position taken by the Court in regard to legislation
other than that involving "civil liberties." Yet when we realize that local activity
-ere impinges upon power delegated to the federal government perhaps it is not to:
exacting for the Court to demand that the taxing agency justify its position.
*This case note first appeared in Volume 30 of the Minnesota Law Review at
page 207, and we are indebted to that publication for permission to reprint it.

